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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
As discussed in part I in the Argument below, the Court
of Appeals is without jurisdiction over this appeal inasmuch as
Appellant George F. Naillon ("Naillon") failed to file a notice
of appeal within thirty days of the November 16, 1992 Order of
Formal Probate and Appointment of Personal Representative as
required by Rule 4, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Naillon's

Rule 60(b) Motion, filed three months later, on February 16,
1993, did not extend the time for filing a notice of appeal and
it should not be allowed to be a substitute for an untimely
appeal.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the Court of Appeals should dismiss

Naillon's appeal for lack of jurisdiction where he did not file a
notice of appeal within thirty days of the Order of Formal
Probate and Appointment of Personal Representative and where he
seeks appellate review of this Order by appealing the district
court's denial of his Petition to Vacate or Set Aside Order.
This question of law is to be considered by the Court de novo,
under a correctness standard of review.

See Scharf v. BMG Corp.,

700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).
2.

Whether the district court properly exercised its

discretion to deny a telephonic request for a continuance by
Naillon's California lawyer and by entering the Order of Formal
Probate of Will and Appointment of Personal Representative where
all interested parties received timely notice of the hearing and
where no objections had been made or filed.
1

This question is

reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.

See Hardy v.

HardV, 776 P.2d 917, 925-26 (Utah App. 1989).
3.

Whether the district court properly denied

Naillon's Petition to Vacate or Set Aside Order where the
Petition did not demonstrate excusable neglect for the delay,

and

where it failed to identify specific evidence that could not have
been discovered earlier and which would warrant setting aside the
Order.

This question is reviewed under an abuse of discretion

standard.

See Birch v. Birch. 771 P.2d 1114, 1117 (Utah App.

1989) .
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
The following statutes and rules whose interpretation
is considered by appellee to be dispositive in this appeal are
listed below.

(They are reproduced in the addendum to this

brief.)
Utah Code Ann. §§ 75-3-401 to -414 (1983) (See Add. A)
Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (See Add. B)
Rule 4, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (See Add. C)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal of the Seventh Judicial District
Court's Order of Formal Probate of the Will of the decedent,
Mildred Meeks, and the Appointment of appellee Robert Gitlin, as
Personal Representative of the estate.

(R.15-18, see Add. D.)

Naillon also appeals the district court's Order denying his Rule
60(b) Petition to Vacate or Set Aside that Order.

(R. 150-51.)

Shortly before the scheduled hearing on the Petition for Formal
Probate filed by Gitlin, Naillon's lawyer in California
2

telephoned the court and asked that the hearing be continued so
that his client could retain a Utah lawyer to review the probate
Petition.

The court denied the request for a continuance, noting

that the Notice of Hearing had been timely sent and that no
protests had been filed.

(R. 18, 162-67, see Add. F and G.)

Three months later, on February 16, 1994, Naillon filed
a Petition under Rule 60(b)(1) and (2), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, to Vacate or Set Aside the Order of Formal Probate and
Appointment of Personal Representative.

(R. 27-29.)

On

September 3, 1993, the District Court entered a Memorandum
Decision, followed by an Order entered October 12, 1993, denying
Naillon's petition.

(R. 145-48, 150-51, see Add. H and I.)

On November 10, 1993, Naillon filed a Notice of Appeal
of the October 12, 1993 Order.

(R. 152-53, see Add. J.)

On

December 13, 1993, the Personal Representative filed a Motion for
Summary Dismissal of Naillon's Appeal on the basis that his
unsuccessful Rule 60(b) Motion did not extend the time to file an
appeal of the November 16, 1992 Order of Formal Probate.

This

motion was denied by the Utah Supreme Court on January 25, 1994,
with the court deferring its ruling on the issue "until plenary
presentation and consideration of the case.
10(f)."

(SSSL Add. K.)

Utah R. App. P.

Also on January 25, 1994, the Utah

Supreme Court ordered this case poured-over to the Utah Court of
Appeals for disposition.

3

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On October 19, 1988, the decedent, Mildred C.

Meeks, executed her Last Will and Testament, and nominated Robert
Gitlin, a long-time friend and neighbor of Ms. Meeks, as personal
representative and named him beneficiary of one-half of her
estate.

(R. 7-11.)

Another friend of Ms. Meeks, Carol

Schroader, was named as alternate personal representative and
beneficiary of the other half of the estate.
2.

(R. 7-8.)

Mildred C. Meeks died on August 10, 1992, at the

age of 81 years.

She was a resident of Carbon County, Utah.

(R.

1-2, 16.)
3.

At the time of her death, decedent had no

surviving spouse, no surviving issue, and no surviving parents.
Decedent had one sister who survived her, Star Pelton, who
resides in Idaho.
4.

(R. 1-2, 17.)

Appellant George F. Naillon, a resident of

California, is a nephew of the decedent Mildred Meeks by virtue
of his being a son of Ms. Meeks other sister, Lucy Naillon, who
died in 1965.
5.

(R. 2, 17.)
On October 27, 1992, Robert Gitlin filed Ms.

Meeks' Will with the Seventh Judicial District Court in Carbon
County, Utah, together with a Petition for Formal Probate of Will
and Appointment of Personal Representative.
6.

(R. 1-11.)

On November 5, 1992, the district court sent a

Notice of Hearing of Mr. Gitlin's Petition to all persons
entitled to receive notice under Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-403,
including to Naillon.

(R. 12-14, see Add. D.)
4

The court's

Notice set the hearing for eleven days later on November 16,
1992, in compliance with Utah Code Ann. §§ 75-3-403 and 75-1-401.
(R. 12, see Add. D.)
7.

At the beginning of the hearing on November 16,

1992, the Court noted on the record that it had just received a
telephone call from an attorney in California who claimed to
represent one of the heirs, George Naillon, and who had requested
a continuance of the hearing so that Naillon could consult with a
local attorney about the probate Petition. (R. 163-64, see Add.
G.)
8.

During the November 16, 1992 hearing, the court

denied Naillon7s oral telephonic request for a continuance,
finding that the Petition was verified, that the Notice of the
hearing had been given in accordance with the rules of procedure,
and that no protests had been filed.

(R. 18, 162-66, see Add. F

and G.)
9.

At the end of the November 16, 1992 hearing, the

court found that the October 19, 1988 Will that had been filed
with the probate Petition was in truth and fact the Last Will and
Testament of Mildred C. Meeks, and the court then signed and
entered the order granting the Petition for Formal Probate of
Will and appointing Robert Gitlin as Personal Representative of
the Estate in accordance with the Will.

(R. 15-18, 162-66, see

Add. E, F, and G.)
10.

Three months later, on February 16, 1993, Naillon

filed a "Petition to Vacate or Set Aside Order" under Rule
60(b)(1) and (2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
5

(R. 27-29.)

Naillon's Memorandum and Affidavit supporting his Petition
claimed that his excusable neglect, and newly discovered
evidence, warranted setting aside the November 16, 1992 Order of
Formal Probate and Appointment of Personal Representative.

(R.

36-53, 116-29.)
11.

The Personal Representative moved to dismiss

Naillon's Petition on the grounds that (1) the Petition was not
timely and substantial prejudice would result if the November 16,
1992 Order was vacated; (2) Naillon had not demonstrated
excusable neglect for not filing his Petition earlier; (3)
Naillon had failed to identify specific newly discovered facts
to justify vacating the November 16, 1992 Order of Formal Probate
of Will; and (4) Naillon lacked standing to challenge the
Personal Representative's appointment because Naillon is not a
beneficiary under the Will and he has no evidence that the Will
is invalid or that any other Will exists.

(R. 64-106, 130-135.)

The Personal Representative also filed a Motion to Strike certain
statements in Naillon's affidavit that were made without
foundation, and that were his conclusory opinions and suspicions,
and were not based on personal knowledge.

(R. 107-11.)

The

Personal Representative also filed an affidavit of Nick Sampinos,
Esq., who drafted the decedent's will, who testified that the
decedent was of sound mind and not under duress at the time she
executed the 1988 Will.
12.

(R. 89-92.)

On September 3, 1993, the Honorable Bruce K.

Halliday of the Seventh Judicial District Court entered a
Memorandum Decision, followed by an Order entered October 12,
6

1993, denying Naillon's Rule 60(b) petition.
see Add. H and I.)

(R. 145-48, 150-51,

The Court did not strike Naillon's affidavit,

stating that it was able to ferret out the conclusionary matters
and the statements made without Naillon's personal knowledge.
(R. 146.)
13.

On November 10, 1993, Naillon filed a Notice of

Appeal of the district court's October 12, 1993 Order.
53, see Add. J.)

(R. 152-

No notice of appeal has ever been filed by

Naillon regarding the district court's November 16, 1992 Order of
Formal Probate.
14.

Naillon's Docketing Statement and his Brief on

Appeal identifies the district court's decision denying Naillon's
requested continuance in connection with the November 16, 1993
Probate Order as the subject of his appeal and as one of the two
issues presented for appellate review.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Naillon's appeal is untimely and it should therefore be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The appeal seeks to reopen

the district court's Order of Formal Probate of Will and
Appointment of Personal Representative.

Under Section 75-3-413

of the Utah Probate Code, an order of formal probate can only be
modified or vacated within the thirty day appeal time.

Naillon

sought to revive his untimely appeal or to vacate the probate
order by filing a Petition under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, and then filing a notice of appeal after that
Petition was denied by the district court.

This backdoor

approach to extend the appeal time should not permitted.
7

The

Order of Formal Probate was a final, appealable Order on the date
it was entered, November 16, 1992. Naillon's appeal was not
filed until one year later, on November 10, 1993.

It should be

dismissed.
Naillon's appeal seeks reversal of two decisions of the
trial court on matters that the trial court is given broad
discretion: whether to grant a continuance and whether to grant a
Rule 60(b) motion to vacate a final order.

The requirements of

the Probate Code regarding notice, hearing, and contents of a
Petition for Formal Probate were followed in all respects by the
Personal Representative and by the district Court.

Naillon's

telephone request for a continuance to get a Utah lawyer did not
caste any doubt on the merits of the probate petition.

Further,

only written objections to the merits of the probate petition
would have warranted a further hearing under the Probate Code.
The court acted within its sound and experienced discretion in
denying the telephone request.
Naillon's 60(b) Petition failed to demonstrate that his
neglect was excusable in waiting for three months to bring his
concerns about this probate to the attention of the court.
Furthermore, his Petition did not contain any newly discovered
evidence to justify reconsideration of the Order of Formal
Probate.

He accuses the Personal Representative of exercising

undue influence and fraud upon the decedent without citing
specific, detailed facts, that are based on his personal
knowledge.

Naillon did not bring any competent evidence to the

8

attention of the trial court to support his Rule 60(b) Petition,
and it was therefore appropriately denied by the trial court.
ARGUMENT
I.

Naillon's Appeal is Untimely and Should be Dismissed
Appellant George Naillon seeks appellate review of the

district court's Probate Order of November 16, 1993, yet no
timely notice of appeal has been filed with respect to that
Order.

Further, Naillon's February 16, 1993 Petition under Rule

60(b) did not extend the time for filing a Notice of Appeal.
This appellate Court, therefore, is without jurisdiction to
consider Naillon's appeal.
Utah law provides that "[f]or good cause shown, an
order in a formal testacy proceeding may be modified or vacated
within the time allowed for appeal."

Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-413;

see also Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-412 ("Subject to appeal and
subject to vacation as provided in this section and in Section
75-3-413, a formal testacy order . . .

is final as to all persons

with respect to all issues concerning the decedent's estate").
An "order admitting a will to probate in the course of formal
testacy proceedings is a final order for purposes of appeal."
Estate of Christensen v. Christensen, 655 P.2d 646, 648 (Utah
1982) .

The "time allowed for appeal" is thirty days.

Utah R.

App. P. 4(a).
Naillon's Rule 60(b) Petition to Vacate was not filed
within thirty days of the November 16, 1992 formal probate order
as required by Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-413.
two months late, on February 16, 1993.
9

Instead, it was filed

Even if Naillon's Rule

60(b) Petition was timely, it did not extend the time for an
appeal.

See Utah R. App. P. 4(b)(only timely post-judgment

motions under rules 50(b), 52(b), and 59 extend the time for
appeal); Holbrook v. Hodson, 24 Utah 2d 120, 466 P.2d 843, 845
(1970); Anderson v. Anderson, 3 Utah 2d 277, 282 P.2d 845, 847
(1955) . As the Utah Supreme Court stated in Fackrell v.
Fackrell, 740 P.2d 1318, 1319 (Utah 1987), a Rule 60(b) motion
"does not save this appeal and prevents us from reaching the
merits of the trial court's original order.

A Rule 60(b) motion

does not extend or toll the thirty-day period in which appeals in
the original action must be filed."
Without a timely notice of appeal, the appellate court
is without jurisdiction over the appeal.
Utah 2d 120, 466 P.2d 843, 845 (1970).

Holbrook v. Hodson, 24

Naillon's appeal of the

district court's Order entered October 12 denying his Rule 60(b)
Petition to Vacate or Set Aside Order is a transparent attempt to
appeal the November 16, 1992 Order.

Naillon's Docketing

Statement, and the issues and arguments made in his brief on
appeal, demonstrates that he is seeking appellate review of the
November 16, 1992 hearing and Order.

As set forth above, he

should have filed his "Petition to Vacate or Set aside Order" no
later than thirty days after the court's Order was entered.
Naillon should not be permitted to use Rule 60(b) to
circumvent the thirty-day time limit specifically prescribed by
in Section 75-3-413 of the Probate Code or as a substitute for
filing a timely appeal.

See Laub v. South Central Utah Tele.

Assoc.. 657 P.2d 1304, 1306 (Utah 1982)("court should consider
10

[ ] whether Rule 60(b) is being used as a substitute for
appeal"); Morse-Starrett Prods. Co. v. Steccone, 205 F.2d 244,
249 (9th Cir. 1953)(same).

If the Court does not dismiss

Naillon's appeal as untimely, and considers the merits of his
arguments about the November 16, 1992 Order of Formal Probate,
precedent would be made that the thirty day appeal time can be
avoided or extended by at least another three months. Under
Naillon's approach, a party who files a Rule 60(b) Motion within
three months after an otherwise final, appealable order, and who
thereafter files an appeal within thirty days of the denial of
that Order, may get the appellate court to review the merits of
the trial court's original order.

This back door approach to

revive untimely issues for appeal is contrary to Section 75-3-413
of the Probate Code, and the Rules of Civil and Appellate
Procedure, and it should not be condoned by the Court.
II.

The District Court Properly Denied the Telephonic
Request for a Continuance by Naillon's California
Lawyer
The Utah Probate Code sets forth specific procedures to

be followed in admitting a will into formal probate and for the
appointment of a personal representative to administer the
affairs of the decedent's estate.

These procedures were followed

in all respects by Mr. Gitlin and by the district court. See
Utah Code §§ 75-3-401 to -414, reprinted at Addendum A,
On October 27, 1992, Mr. Gitlin filed the Petition for
Formal Probate of Will and Appointment of Personal
Representative.

(R. 1-11.)

The Petition contained all the

information required under the Probate Code for the Will to be
11

formally probated, including the names and addresses of all known
heirs, beneficiaries, and interested persons, and the original
Last Will and Testament of the decedent.

See Utah Code Ann.

§§ 75-3-401 and -402. On November 5, 1994, Notice of the hearing
on the Petition was mailed by the clerk of the court to all
persons listed in the Petition, including to Naillon.
see Add. D.)

(R. 12-14,

The Notice was mailed "at least ten days before the

time set for the hearing," in accordance with Utah Code §§ 75-3403 and 75-1-401.
Mr. Naillon did not file or make any objection with the
court to justify not accepting the decedent's Will into probate.
The Utah Probate Code requires that written objections be made:
"Any party to a formal proceeding who opposes the probate of a
will for any reason shall state in his pleadings his objections
to probate of the will."
added).

Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-404 (emphasis

A telephone request for a continuance of a duly noticed

hearing is not provided for in the Probate Code, and such a
request is insufficient to warrant scheduling the matter for
trial as Naillon suggests on appeal.

(Appellant's Brief at 10.)

Furthermore, Naillon's telephone request, which was made right
before the hearing was scheduled to start, did not include any
claim that the Will offered by Gitlin was invalid, that the
Notice of hearing was improper, or that the Petition was
defective in any respect.

(R.163.)

Rather, Naillon's lawyer

simply sought a continuance of the duly noticed hearing to enable
his client more time to consult a local attorney about the
Petition.

(Id.)
12

Given these circumstances, the district court acted in
accordance with the Probate Code in ordering the formal probate
of the Will and appointing Mr. Gitlin as personal representative.
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-409. Naillon cannot reasonably contend
that this was an abuse of discretion by the court.

See Hardy v.

Hardy, 776 P.2d 917, 925-26 (Utah App. 1989)(whether to grant
continuance rests in sound discretion of trial court).

The court

simply followed the procedures outlined in the Code; Naillon did
not.
Ill.

The District Court Properly Denied Naillon's Rule 60(b)
Motion to Vacate or Set Aside the Order of Formal
Probate
The Utah Supreme Court has stated the following with

regard to judicial review of a Rule 60(b) motion:
In addition to the concerns that final
judgments should not be lightly disturbed and
that unjust judgments should not be allowed
to stand, other factors the court should
consider are whether rule 60(b) is being used
as a substitute for appeal, whether the
movant had a fair opportunity to make his
objection at trial, and whether the motion
was made within a reasonable time after entry
of judgment. 7 J. Moore & J. Lucas, Moore's
Federal Practice U 60.19 (2d ed. 1982).
Laub v. South Central Utah Tele. Assoc. 657 P.2d 1304, 1306
(Utah 1982).

The Utah Supreme Court has also said that "the

district court judge is vested with considerable discretion under
Rule 60(b),. in granting or denying a motion to set aside a
judgment."

Katz v. Pierce. 732 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1986).

Naillon asserted excusable neglect and newly discovered
evidence as the bases for his Rule 60(b) Petition to Vacate or
Set Aside the November 16, 1992 Order of Formal Probate. Neither
13

basis had merit and Naillon's Rule 60(b) was properly denied by
the district court. (R. 145-48, 150-51.)
(1) Naillon Did Not Demonstrate Excusable Neglect
Naillon argued before the district court, and again
argues on appeal, that he did not raise his concerns about this
probate earlier because he could not find a Utah attorney who was
willing to help him.

This may explain why he did not have a Utah

lawyer appear in person at the November 16, 1992 hearing, but it
does not explain why he did not come to Utah himself to be
present at the hearing, or why he did not file any document with
the court identifying reasons why the Will should not be
probated.

Naillon did neither of these things and has offered no

reasonable explanation to explain this neglect.

"Mere

inconvenience or the press of personal or business affairs is not
deemed as an excuse for failure to appear at trial."

Valley

Leasing v. Houghton, 661 P.2d 959, 960 (Utah 1983).
Naillon's contention that he contacted thirteen
attorneys who would not appear on his behalf (Appellant's Brief
at 9) is more of an indication as to the lack of merit of his
case than an indication that his neglect was excusable.
Naillon's Affidavit states that he contacted all these attorneys
before the November 16, 1992, hearing, not afterwards.
50.)

(R.49-

There was no indication in Naillon's 60(b) Petition or in

his Affidavit to justify why he could not have presented his
concerns about this estate between the time of his aunt's death
on August 10, 1992 and the hearing on November 16, 1992, nor is
there any justification why the information could not have been
14

gathered and presented within thirty days after the hearing.

In

short, Naillon failed to establish that his neglect in bringing
his concerns to the attention of the court in a timely manner was
excusable.
(2) No Evidence was Presented by Naillon to Warrant
Setting Aside the Probate Order
Perhaps the most compelling reason to affirm the
district court's exercise of discretion in denying Naillon's Rule
60(b) Motion is the reason given by Judge Halliday in his
Memorandum Decision: "the Court finds the Affidavit [of George F.
Naillon] to be insufficient to give rise to a justifiable reason
for setting aside the original Order of Judge Bunnell."
47.)

(R. 146-

The court explained further:
The only factual allegation contained in the
Affidavit that bears upon some undo influence at the
time of the execution of the Will is really
inferential, and that is from the fact that Mr. Gitlin
was named in the Will as a donee five years ago and was
named as a grantee in a deed executed seven days prior
to the decedents death, at a time the Affiant believed
she may have been in pain and under the influence of
some unspecified drugs. We are asked to infer that
Gitlin exercised undue influence over the Decedent's
execution of the Will. That inference requires a leap
of faith that this Court cannot make.

(R. 147-48.)
In Naillon's Brief on Appeal, he again alludes to
having recently discovered "evidence of duress, undue influence,
fraud and other issues which negate the initial findings of the
Court."

Appellant's Brief at 12. Noticeably absent from these

invidious, conclusory allegations are any citations to the record
of the trial court.

"This Court need not, and will not, consider

any facts not properly cited to, or supported by, the record."
15

Uckerman v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 588 P.2d 142, 143 (Utah
1978); Utah R. App. P. 24(e).

Naillon made these same type of

conclusory accusations in his Affidavit filed with his Rule 60(b)
Petition, which the district court found unpersuasive (R. 14648), and which gave rise to the Personal Representative's Motion
to Strike. (R.107-111.)

The Utah Supreme Court has held that,

among other requirements, claims of newly discovered evidence in
a Rule 60(b) motion must be supported by "specific, detailed
facts," that would justify a trial on the issue raised, not
unfounded, conclusory allegations such as Naillon has made here.
State v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053, 1056-57 (Utah 1983).

Given

Naillon's untimely and inadequate claims, the district court's
sound discretion in denying Naillon's 60(b) Petition should be
affirmed.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the Court of Appeals should
dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Alternatively, the

Court should affirm the district court's Order denying Naillon's
Rule 60(b) Petition to Vacate or Set Aside Order of Formal
Probate of Will and Appointment of Personal Representative.
DATED this

/ f

day of May, 1994.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY

/
:ies D. Gilson
Attorneys for Appellee Robert
Gitlin, Personal Representative
of the Estate of Mildred C. Meeks
193\55916
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ADDENDUM INDEX
Sections 75-3-401 to -414, Utah Code Ann. (1983)

A

Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

B

Rule 4, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure

C

Notice, Affidavit of Posting and Mailing

D

Formal Probate of Will and Appointment of Personal
Representative

E

Minute Entry

F

Transcript of November 16, 1992 Hearing

G

Memorandum Decision

H

Order [Denying Petition to Vacate or Set Aside Order]

I

Notice of Appeal

J

Denial of Motion to Summarily Dismiss Appeal

K
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75-3-401. Formal testacy proceedings — Nature — When
commenced.
(1) A formal testacy proceeding is litigation to determine whether a decedent left a valid will. A formal testacy proceeding may be commenced by an
interested person filing a petition as described in Subsection 75-3-402(1) in
which he requests that the court, after notice and hearing, enter an order
probating a will, or a petition to set aside an informal probate of a will or to
prevent informal probate of a will which is the subject of a pending application, or a petition in accordance with Subsection 75-3-402(3) for an order that
the decedent died intestate.
(2) A petition may seek formal probate of a will without regard to whether
the same or a conflicting will has been informally probated. A formal testacy
proceeding may, but need not, involve a request for appointment of a personal
representative.
(3) During the pendency of a formal testacy proceeding, the registrar shall
not act upon any application for informal probate of any will of the decedent or
any application for informal appointment of a personal representative of the
decedent.
(4) Unless a petition in a formal testacy proceeding also requests confirmation of the previous informal appointment, a previously appointed personal
representative, after receipt of notice of the commencement of a formal probate proceeding, must refrain from exercising his power to make any further
distribution of the estate during the pendency of the formal proceeding. A
petitioner who seeks the appointment of a different personal representative in
a formal proceeding also may request an order restraining the acting personal
representative from exercising any of the powers of his office and requesting
the appointment of a special administrator. In the absence of a request, or if
the request is denied, the commencement of a formal proceeding has no effect
on the powers and duties of a previously appointed personal representative
other than those relating to distribution.

75-3-402. Formal testacy or appointment proceedings —
Petition — Contents.
(1) Petitions for formal probate of a will, or for adjudication of intestacy
with or without request for appointment of a personal representative, must be
directed to the court, request a judicial order after notice and hearing, and
contain further statements as indicated in this section. A petition for formal
probate of a will:
(a) Requests an order as to the testacy of the decedent in relation to a
particular instrument which may or may not have been informally probated and determining the heirs;
(b) Contains the statements required for informal applications as
stated in Subsection 75-3-301(2) and the statements required by Subsections 75-3-301(3)(b) and (c), and, if the petition requests appointment of a
personal representative, the statements required by Subsection
75-3-301(4); and
(c) States whether the original of the last will of the decedent is in the
possession of the court or accompanies the petition.
(2) If the original will is neither in the possession of the court nor accompanies the petition and no authenticated copy of a will probated in another
jurisdiction accompanies the petition, the petition also must state the contents
of the will and indicate that it is lost, destroyed, or otherwise unavailable.
(3) A petition for adjudication of intestacy and appointment of an administrator in intestacy must request a judicial finding and order that the decedent
left no will and determining the heirs, contain the statements required by
Subsections 75-3-301(2) and 75-3-301(5) and indicate whether supervised administration is sought. A petition may request an order determining intestacy
and heirs without requesting the appointment of an administrator, in which
case, the statements required by Subsection 75-3-30l(5)(b) above may be omitted.

75-3-403. Formal testacy proceeding — Notice of hearing
on petition.
(1) Upon commencement of a formal testacy proceeding, the court shall fix
a time and place of hearing. Notice shall be given in the manner prescribed by
Section 75-1-401 by the petitioner to the persons herein enumerated and to
any additional person who has filed a demand for notice under Section
75-3-204. Notice shall be given to the following persons: the surviving spouse,
children, and other heirs of the decedent, the devisees and executors named in
any will that is being, or has been, probated, or offered for informal or formal
probate in the county, or that is known by the petitioner to have been probated, or offered for informal or formal probate elsewhere, and any personal
representative of the decedent whose appointment has not been terminated.
Notice may be given to other persons. In addition, the petitioner shall give
notice by publication to all unknown persons and to all known persons whose
addresses are unknown who have any interest in the matters being litigated.
(2) If it appears by the petition or otherwise that the fact of the death of the
alleged decedent may be in doubt, or on the written demand of any interested
person, a copy of the notice of the hearing on the petition shall be sent by
registered mail to the alleged decedent at his last known address. The court
shall direct the petitioner to report the results of, or make and report back
concerning, a reasonably diligent search for the alleged decedent in any manner that may seem advisable, including any or all of the following methods:
(a) By inserting in one or more suitable periodicals a notice requesting
information from any person having knowledge of the whereabouts of the
alleged decedent;
(b) By notifying law enforcement officials and public welfare agencies
in appropriate locations of the disappearance of the alleged decedent;
(c) By engaging the services of an investigator. The costs of any search
so directed shall be paid by the petitioner if there is no administration or
by the estate of the decedent in case there is administration.

75-3-404. Formal testacy proceedings — Written objections to probate.
Any party to a formal proceeding who opposes the probate of a will for any
reason shall state in his pleadings his objections to probate of the will.

75-3-405. Formal testacy proceedings — Uncontested
cases — Hearings and proof.
If a petition in a testacy proceeding is unopposed, the court may order
probate or intestacy on the strength of the pleadings if satisfied that the
conditions of Section 75-3-409 have been met or conduct a hearing in open
court and require proof of the matters necessary to support the order sought. If
evidence concerning execution of the will is necessary, the affidavit or testimony of one of any attesting witnesses to the instrument is sufficient. If the
affidavit or testimony of an attesting witness is not available, execution of the
will may be proved by other evidence or affidavit.

75-3-406. Formal testacy proceedings — Contested cases
— Testimony of attesting witnesses.
(1) If evidence concerning execution of an attested will which is not selfproved is necessary in contested cases, the testimony of at least one of the
attesting witnesses, if within the state, competent, and able to testify, is
required. Due execution of an attested or unattested will may be proved by
other evidence.
(2) If the will is self-proved, compliance with signature requirements for
execution is conclusively presumed and other requirements of execution are
presumed subject to rebuttal without the testimony of any witness upon filing
the will and the acknowledgment and affidavits annexed or attached thereto,
unless there is proof of fraud or forgery affecting the acknowledgment or
affidavit.

75-3-407. Formal testacy proceedings — Burdens in contested cases.
(1) In contested cases, petitioners who seek to establish intestacy have the
burden of establishing prima facie proof of death, venue, and heirship. Proponents of a will have the burden of establishing prima facie proof of due execution in all cases, and if they are also petitioners, prima facie proof of death and
venue. Contestants of a will have the burden of establishing lack of testamentary intent or capacity, undue influence, fraud, duress, mistake, or revocation.
Except in cases where a presumption is operable, parties have the ultimate
burden of persuasion as to matters with respect to which they have the initial
burden of proof. Where one or more presumptions are operable, the ultimate
burden of persuasion shall be determined in accordance with the Utah Rules
of Evidence.
(2) If a will is opposed by the petition for probate of a later will revoking the
former, it shall be determined first whether the later will is entitled to probate, and if a will is opposed by a petition for a declaration of intestacy, it
shall be determined first whether the will is entitled to probate.

75-3-408. Formal testacy proceedings — Will construction
— Effect of final order in another jurisdiction.
A final order of a court of another state determining testacy, the validity, or
construction of a will, made in a proceeding involving notice to and an opportunity for contest by all interested persons must be accepted as determinative
by the courts of this state if it includes, or is based upon, a finding that the
decedent was domiciled at his death in the state where the order was made.

75-3-409. Formal testacy proceedings — Order — Foreign
will.
After the time required for any notice has expired, upon proof of notice, and
after any hearing that may be necessary, if the court finds that the testator is
dead, venue is proper and that the proceeding was commenced within the
limitation prescribed by Section 75-3-107, it shall determine the decedent's
domicile at death, his heirs, and his state of testacy. Any will found to be valid
and unrevoked shall be formally probated. Termination of any previous informal appointment of a personal representative, which may be appropriate in
view of the relief requested and findings, is governed by Section 75-3-612. The
petition shall be dismissed or appropriate amendment allowed if the court is
not satisfied that the alleged decedent is dead. A will from a place which does
not provide for probate of a will after death may be proved for probate in this
state by a duly authenticated certificate of its legal custodian that the copy
introduced is a true copy and that the will has become effective under the law
of the other place.

75-3-410. Formal testacy proceedings — Probate of more
than one instrument
If two or more instruments are offered for probate before a final order is
entered in a formal testacy proceeding, more than one instrument may be
probated if neither expressly revokes the other or contains provisions which
work a total revocation by implication. If more than one instrument is probated, the order shall indicate what provisions control in respect to the nomination of an executor, if any. The order may, but need not, indicate how any
provisions of a particular instrument are affected by the other instrument.
After a final order in a testacy proceeding has been entered, no petition for
probate of any other instrument of the decedent may be entertained, except
incident to a petition to vacate or modify a previous probate order and subject
to the time limits of Section 75-3-412.

75-3-411. Formal testacy proceedings — Partial intestacy.
If it becomes evident in the course of a formal testacy proceeding that,
though one or more instruments are entitled to be probated, the decedent's
estate is or may be partially intestate, the court shall enter an order to that
effect.

75-3-412. Formal testacy proceedings — Effect of order —
Vacation.
(1) Subject to appeal and subject to vacation as provided in this section and
in Section 75-3-413, a formal testacy order under this part, including an order
that the decedent left no valid will and determining heirs, is final as to all
persons with respect to all issues concerning the decedent's estate that the
court considered or might have considered incident to its rendition relevant to
the question of whether the decedent left a valid will, and to the determination of heirs, except that:
(a) The court shall entertain a petition for modification or vacation of
its order and probate of another will of the decedent if it is shown that the
proponents of the later-offered will were unaware of its existence at the
time of the earlier proceeding or were unaware of the earlier proceeding
and were given no notice of it, except by publication.
(b) If intestacy of all or part of the estate has been ordered, the determination of heirs of the decedent may be reconsidered if it is shown that one
or more persons were omitted from the determination and it is also shown
that the persons were unaware of their relationship to the decedent, were
unaware of his death, or were given no notice of any proceeding concerning his estate, except by publication.
(c) The order originally rendered in the testacy proceeding may be
modified or vacated, if appropriate under the circumstances, by the order
of probate of the later-offered will or the order redetermining heirs.
(d) The finding of the fact of death is conclusive as to the alleged decedent only if notice of the hearing on the petition in the formal testacy
proceeding was sent by registered or certified mail addressed to the alleged decedent at his last known address and the court finds that a search
under Subsection 75-3-403(2) was made.
(2) If the alleged decedent is not dead, even if notice was sent and search
was made, he may recover estate assets in the hands of the personal representative. In addition to any remedies available to the alleged decedent by reason
of any fraud or intentional wrongdoing, the alleged decedent may recover any
estate or its proceeds from distributees that is in their hands, or the value of
distributions received by them, to the extent that any recovery from distributees is equitable in view of all the circumstances.
(3) A petition for vacation under either Subsections (l)(a) or (b) must be
filed prior to the earlier of the following time limits:
(a) If a personal representative has been appointed for the estate, the
time of entry of any order approving final distribution of the estate, or, if
the estate is closed by statement, six months after the filing of the closing
statement.
(b) Whether or not a personal representative has been appointed for
the estate of the decedent, the time prescribed by Section 75-3-107 when
it is no longer possible to initiate an original proceeding to probate a will
of the decedent.
(c) Twelve months after the entry of the order sought to be vacated.

75-3-413- Formal testacy proceedings — Vacation of order
for other cause.
For good cause shown, an order in a formal testacy proceeding may be
modified or vacated within the time allowed for appeal.

75-3-414. Formal proceedings concerning appointment of
personal representative.
(DA formal proceeding for adjudication regarding the priority or qualification of one who is an applicant for appointment as personal representative, or
of one who previously has been appointed personal representative in informal
proceedings, if an issue concerning the testacy of the decedent is or may be
involved, is governed by Section 75-3-402. as well as by this section. In other
cases, the petition shall contain or adopt the statements required by Subsection 75-3-301(2) and describe the question relating to priority or qualification
of the personal representative which is to be resolved. If the proceeding precedes any appointment of a personal representative, it shall stay any pending
informal appointment proceedings as well as any commenced thereafter. If the
proceeding is commenced after appointment, the previously appointed personal representative, after receipt of notice thereof, shall refrain from exercising any power of administration except as necessary to preserve the estate or
unless the court orders otherwise.
(2) After notice to interested persons, including all persons interested in the
administration of the estate as successors under the applicable assumption
concerning testacy, any previously appointed personal representative and any
person having or claiming priority for appointment as personal representative, the court shall determine who is entitled to appointment under Section
75-3-203, make a proper appointment and. if appropriate, terminate any prior
appointment found to have been improper as provided in cases of removal
under Section 75-3-611.
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Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order.

(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may
in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party;
(4) when, for any cause, the summons m an action has not been personally
served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has
failed to appear in said action: i5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that
the judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any other reason
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A
motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or
suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these
rules or by an independent action.
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Rule 4. Appeal as of right: when taken.
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an appeal
is permitted as a matter of right from the trial court to the appellate court, the
notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial
court within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed
from. However, when a judgment or order is entered in a statutory forcible
entry or unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3
shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 10 days after the date of
entry of the judgment or order appealed from.
(b) Motions post judgment or order. If a timely motion under the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1) for judgment under Rule 50(b); (2) under Rule 52(b) to amend or make additional
findings of fact, whether or not an alteration of the judgment would be required if the motion is granted: (3) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the
judgment; or (4) under Rule 59 for a new trial, the time for appeal for all
parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting
or denying any other such motion. Similarly, if a timely motion under the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1)
under Rule 24 for a new trial: or i2) under Rule 26 for an order, after judgment, affecting the substantial rights of a defendant, the time for appeal for
all parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting or denying any other such motion. A notice of appeal filed before the
disposition of any of the above motions shall have no effect. A new notice of
appeal must be filed within the prescribed time measured from the entry of
the order of the trial court disposing of the motion as provided above.
(c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or order. Except as provided in
paragraph (b) of this rule, a notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a
decision, judgment, or order but before the entry of the judgment or order of
the trial court shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day thereof.
(d) Additional or cross-appeal. If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a
party, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date
on which the first notice of appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise
prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule, whichever period last expires.
(e) Extension of time to appeal. The trial court, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal
upon motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the time
prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule. A motion filed before expiration of the
prescribed time may be ex parte unless the trial court otherwise requires.
Notice of a motion filed after expiration of the prescribed time shall be given
to the other parties in accordance with the rules of practice of the trial court.
No extension shall exceed 30 days past the prescribed time or 10 days from the
date of entry of the order granting the motion, whichever occurs later.
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR CARBON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE

:

ESTATE OF

::

MILDRED C. MEEKS,

:

DECEASED.

\
:

NOTICE

Probate No. 923-43

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT ON October 27, 1992, Robert
Gitlin, whose address is 398 West 2900 South, Price, UT 84501
filed with the Clerk of the Court a petition praying for: FORMAL
PROBATE OF WILL AND APPOINTMENT OF PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE
(A
copy of the petition is on file with the Clerk of the Court and
may be reviewed upon request.)
Hearing on said petition will be had before the
above-entitled Court in Room 120 of the Carbon County Court
Complex in Price, Carbon County, State of Utah, on NOVEMBER
16, 1992, at 9:30 o'clock a.m., at which time and place all
persons interested in said estate may appear and show cause, if
any they have, why said petition should not be granted.
WITNESS the Clerk of said Court and the seal hereof
affixed this 5th day of November, 1992.

BARBARA PROCARIONE, CLERK

(SEAL)

B Y ^ ^^ri.r,^
Clerk
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR CARBON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE

:

ESTATE OF

::
:

MILDRED C. MEEKS,

:

DECEASED.

::

AFFIDAVIT OF POSTING
AND MAILING

Probate No. 923-43

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss
COUNTY OF CARBON)
I, Barbara Procarione, being duly sworn, deposes and
says:
That she is, and at all times herein mentioned, was,
and now is, the duly appointed, qualified and acting Deputy Court
Clerk of the District Court: of Carbon County, State of Utah. That
on the 5th day of November, 1992, she caused to be posted in three
public places in Carbon County, copies of the herein attached
notice of application for: FORMAL PROBATE OF WILL AND APPOINTMENT
OF PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE
TO-WIT: One copy on the bulletin board, front
corridor, Carbon County Court Complex, Price, Utah; one copy on
the bulletin board for legal notices, corridor, City Hall, Helper,
Utah; and one copy on the bulletin board for legal notices at the
John W. Galbreath Office, East Carbon, Utah—all in Carbon County,
Utah.
That on the 5th day of November, 1992, she mailed true
and correct copies of the hereunto attached notice to the persons
listed below and directed to their respective places of residence

r.nr\m *3

as shown after their names; that the copies so mailed were
enclosed in a sealed envelope and deposited in the United States
Mail, with postage thereon prepaid:
1. Carol Schroader, c/o Ralph W. Rasmussen, Jr., 389 North
University Ave., P. 0. Box 432, Provo, UT 84603
2. Starr Pelton, 321 Cameron Drive, Osburn, ID 83849-1023
3. William James Naillon, 498 Vick Drive, Santa Cruz, CA 95060
4. George Francis Naillon, 11103 Mt. Vernon Road, Auburn, CA
95603
5. Margie Ann Naillon, c/o William J. Naillon, 498 Vick Drive,
Santa Cruz, CA 95060
6. Patricia Carol Naillon/Candelaria, 2775 Croft Drive, San Jose,
CA 95148
7. John Rolland Naillon, Jr., 9507 LaPorte Road, Bangor, CA
95914
8. Michael George Naillon, Sr. , 10934 SE 254 Place, Kent, WA
98031
9. Danny William Naillon, 413 San Juan, Los Banos, CA 93633*
10. Tammy Michelle Naillon, 2775 Croft Drive, San Jose, CA 95148
11. Robert Gitlin, 398 West 2900 South, Price, UT 84501
12. James D. Gilson, Susan G. Lawrence, VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL
& MCCARTHY, Attorneys at Law, 50 South Main Street, Suite
1600, P.O. Box 45340, Salt Lake City, Ut 84145
13. Nick Sampinos, Attorney at Law, 80 West Main, Suite 201,
Price, UT 84501

Clerk/Deputy
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 5th day of
November, 1992.

elm? k-/ Deputy

00001d

(/
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VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
James D. Gilson (5472)
Susan G. Lawrence (5305)
Attorneys for the Petitioner
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P. O. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 532-3333
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH, PROBATE DIVISION
In the Matter of the Estate
)
)
)
)

Of
MILDRED C. MEEKS,
Deceased,

)

FORMAL PROBATE OF WILL
AND APPOINTMENT OF
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE
Probate No.

923-43

Upon consideration of the Petition for Formal Probate
of Will and Formal Appointment of Personal Representative filed
by Robert Gitlin, on the 27th day of October, 1992, the Court
finds as follows:
1.

The Petition for Formal Probate of Will and

Formal Appointment of Personal Representative is complete.
2.

The petitioner has made oath or affirmation that

the statements contained in the Petition are true to the best of
his knowledge and belief.
3.

The petitioner appears from the Petition to be an

interested person as defined by the Utah Uniform Probate Code.

ononis

4.

On the basis of the statements in the Petition,

venue is proper because the decedent was domiciled in Carbon
County, Utah at the time of her death.
5.

Any required notice has been given or waived.

6.

The decedent' s Last Will and Testament of MILDRED

C. MEEKS constitutes the decedent' s Last Will and Testament.
7.

The Petition does not indicate the existence of a

possible unrevoked testamentary instrument which may relate to
property subject to the laws of this state, and which is not
filed for probate in this court.
8.

The Petition does not relate to one or more of a

known series of testamentary instruments (other than Wills and
Codicils), the latest of which does not expressly revoke the
earlier.
9.

It appears from the Petition that the time limit

for formal appointment has not expired.
10.

Based on the statements in the Petition, ?>.cbert

Gitlin, the person whose appointment is sought, is nominated in
the Last Will and Testament of the decedent as the personal
representative, is qualified to act as personal representative,
and has a prior right to appointment.
11.

On the basis of the statements in the Petition,

no personal representative has been appoinred in this state or
elsewhere.

-2184X18971.1

12.

The names, addresses and relationships of the

heirs and devisees of the decedent are as follows:
Relationship

Address

Name
Carol Schroader

c/o Ralph W. Rasmus sen, Jr.
389 North University Ave.
P. 0. Box 432
Provo, UT 84603

beneficiary
under will

Starr Pelton

321 Cameron Drive
Osburn, ID 83849-1023

sister

William James
Naillon

498 Vick Drive
Santa Cruz, CA

nephew

George Francis
Naillon

11103 Mt. Vernon Road
Auburn, CA 95603

nephew

Margie Ann Naillon

936 West Julian Street
San Jose, CA 95008

niece

Patricia Carol
Naillon/Candelaria

2775 Croft Drive
San Jose, CA 95148

grand niece

John Rolland
Naillon, Jr.

9507 LaPorte Road
Bangor, CA 95914

grand nephew

Michael George
Naillon, Sr.

10934 SE 254 Place
Kent, WA 93031

grand nephew

Danny William
Naillon

413 San Juan
Los Banos, CA

grand nephew

Tammy Michelle
Naillon

2775 Croft Drive
San Jose, CA 95148

95060

93 635
grand niece

All of the foregoing individuals are adults.
NOW, THEREFORE, the Petition is hereby granted, the
Last Will and Testament of MILDRED C. MEEKS, dated October 18,
198 8, is hereby formally pxobared, Robext Gitiin is hereby
-3184X18971.1

appointed personal representative of the decedent' s estate, to
act without bond in an unsupervised administration, and upon
qualification and acceptance Letters Testamentary shall be
issued to the said personal representative.
DATED this

/ ^

day of
BY THE

-4184M8971. 1

'/%S^^^^1992.
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SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF CARBON, STATE OF UTAH
BOYD BUNNELL, DISTRICT JUDGE
ELECTRONIC RECORDING

DATE: Nov 16, 1992 - 9:30 am
CASE NO: Probate No. 923-43

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE

Nick Sampinos

OF
MILDRED C. MEEKS, Deceased
MINUTE ENTRY
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COURT: FORMAL PROBATE OF WILL &
APPOINTMENT OF PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE
The Court advised counsel that an attorney from California
had called advising that he was representing George Frandsen
Nailon and Mr. Nailon was requesting time to confer with local
counsel. There was objection from Mr. Sampinos. Said petition
being verified and noticed for hearing, and there being no
protests on file, the Court now
FINDS AND ORDERS: That the document entitled Last Will and
Testament of Mildred C. Meeks is in truth and fact her last will
and the same is admitted to probate. The Court will appoint
Robert Gitlin as personal representative of this estate upon
taking of the oath. No bond will be required.
bap
Tape 92-59/3700
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
CARBON COUNTY

2

-OOQ-

3
4
5
6

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE
OF

Case No. 923700043

MILDRED C. MEEKS.

ORIGINAL

7
8

-o0o-

9
10

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 16th day of November,

11

1992, the above-entitled matter came on.for hearing before

12

the HONORABLE BRUCE K. HALLIDAY, sitting as Judge in the

13

above-named Court for the purpose of this cause, and that

14

the following proceedings were had.

15
16
17
13

-oOoA P P E A R A N C E S
NICK SAMPINOS
Attorney at Law
80 West Main, #201
Price, Utah
84501

IS
20
21
22
23
24
25
PENNY C. ABBOTT, C.S.R.
3241 SOUTH 4840 MEST
WEST VALLEY CITY, UTAH 84123
PHONE: 966-4862

r* -t ,i a* r%

^

1

P R O C E E D I N G S

2
3
4

THE COURT:

Let's s e e , Probate No. 90-23-43,

m a t t e r of the E s t a t e of M i l d r e d C. M e e k s .

5

M r . S a m p i n o s , I j u s t r e c e i v e d a call f r o m an

6

attorney in California who claimed to b e representing one

7

o f t h e h e i r s t h a t lives in C a l i f o r n i a , claimed h e just g o t

8

t h e n o t i c e F r i d a y , a l t h o u g h t h e m a i l i n g c e r t i f i c a t e says it

9

went out on the 5th of November.

10

L e t ' s s e e , let m e g e t h i s n a m e off t h e m a i l i n g

11

affidavit.

12

N a y l a n is t h e n a m e .

13

a n d he requested that we give M r . George Frances Naylan

14

t i m e to c o n s u l t an a t t o r n e y h e r e a b o u t t h e m a t t e r and I —

15

w e l l , I told him that I wouldn't do it unless you consented

16

b e c a u s e — i n o t h e r w o r d s , t h e n o t i c e s h a v e g o n e o u t and

17

there isn't any written protest on file.

IS

O h , h e r e it is o v e r h e r e .

George Frances

T h e a t t o r n e y ' s n a m e is Rod S h e p h e r d ,

MR. SAMPINOS:

W e l l , a n d I w o u l d p o s e an o b j e c t i o n

13

W e ' v e h a d commnnicati on w i t h t h e N a y l a n p e o p l e , t h e n o t i c e s

20

d i d g o o u t and w e ' d like t o g e t t h i s r o l l i n g .

21

t h a t m u c h i n v o l v e d in this e s t a t e , a n d I'd like t o —

22 I
23

THE COURT:

There's not

Is t h e — i s t h e p e t i t i o n e r n a m e d in

the V i l l ?

24

MR. SAMPINOS:

25

THE COURT:

Yes.

As the personal

f\*%*<

t

?l^

representative?

MR. SAMPINOS:
THE COURT:

Yes.

Well, of course, I tried to explain to

him that that was usually the sase,
<
that filing objections
is a waste of everybody 1s time , but —
MR. SAMPINOS:
THE COURT:

And I feel the same, your Honor.

Because <
a lot of times, you get heirs

who--whe]re you have as jtiany as youfve got here, what have
you got, about—
MR. SAMPINOS:
THE COURT:

Seven or eight of them.

A whole list of heirs. And some of

them from out of state always •think that Aunt Susie left
$100 ,000 and :L'm not getting my share—
MR. SAMPINOS:
THE COURT:

Right •

- -when she actually left maybe

<
$10,000 and—
MR. SAMPINOS:
THE COURT:

Or less.

That's not an unusual scenario we run

into from cecple that are nn^^^il*i ^T* with facts , but I
hate to beg up thee time of the Court.
So I told him if you—if you objected, I wouldn't
give him any time, but if you consented, we would continue
it for two weeks, but—
MR. SAMPINOS:
^1 1

I'll object.
•*- •! ~»-»«L.

T f U ^ ^ ^ I ^4-

-*-V^ ^msun^^mA^

ShCW

that this oetition is verified, it's noticed for hearina at

3

1

this day and hour, in accordance with with our rules of

2

procedure.

There are no protests on file.

3

The Court finds that the document filed with the

4

Court entitled Last Will and Testament of Mildred C. Meeks

5

is in truth and fact her last will and testament.

6

Court hereby appoints Robert Gitlin as the personal

7

representative of this estate.

8

the oath.

9

The

He will qualify upon taking

No bond will be required.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. SAMPINOS:

12

THE COURT:

The 16th?

The 16th, yeah.
Thank you, your Honor*

Let's see.

Barbara, I told

13

Mr. Shepherd he could check back with you later on today

14

and you'd tell him what we did in this case, out of couxtesy

15

t o him.

16

(Whereupon, t h i s h e a r i n g was c o n c l u d e d . )

17
13
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

*

*

*

TRANSCRIBER'S

CERTIFICATE

2
3
4 I

I, Toni F r y e , d o h e r e b y c e r t i f y that I a m a

5

t r a n s c r i b e r for Penny C. A b b o t t , C e r t i f i e d

Shorthand

6

R e p o r t e r a n d Certified C o u r t T r a n s c r i b e r of t a p e r e c o r d e d

7

court p r o c e e d i n g s ; that I r e c e i v e d t h e e l e c t r o n i c a l l y

8

r e c o r d e d t a p e of the w i t h i n m a t t e r a n d under her supervision]

9 J h a v e t r a n s c r i b e d t h e same i n t o t y p e w r i t i n g , and t h a t t h e
10

I f o r e g o i n g p a g e s , n u m b e r e d f r o m 1 t o 4 , to t h e b e s t o f m y

^

ability constitute a full, true and correct transcription,

12

I e x c e p t w h e r e it is i n d i c a t e d t h e t a p e recorded

13

I proceedings were inaudible*

14 J
15

court

I d o further c e r t i f y t h a t I a m not c o u n s e l ,

I a t t o r n e y o r r e l a t i v e o f e i t h e r p a r t y , o r clerk or s t e n o -

16

g r a p h e r o f either p a r t y o r of t h e a t t o r n e y of either p a r t y ,

17

o r o t h e r w i s e interested i n t h e e v e n t o f this suit

IS
13

D A T E D at Salt L a k e C i t y , U t a h , this 7th d a y o f

December

1993.

20
21
22
23
24
25

Transcriber

f

C E R T I F I C A T E
STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

:
)

ss.

I, PENNY C. ABBOTT, a Certified Shorthand
Reporter, do hereby certify that I received the electronically recorded tape (No, 92-59) in the matter of the
Estate of Mildred C, Meeks, and that I caused it to be
transcribed into typewriting, and that a full, true, and
correct transcription of said hearing so recorded and
transcribed is set forth in the foregoing pages numbered
from 1 to 4, inclusive, and that said pages constitute an
accurate and complete transcription of all the proceedings
adduced at the hearing and contained on the tape except
where it is indicated that the proceeding was inaudible*
WITNESS MY HAND and official seal at Salt Lake
City, Utah, this 7th day of December, 1993.

~xr

^GM*£t

Penny C.^bbott, C.S.R.
License #93
My commission expires:

Sept. 24, 1996

p. r\ n i Q ^
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•SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT
STATE OF UTAH

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH
In the Matter of the Estate

MEMORANDUM DECISION

of
MILDRED C. MEEKS,
Deceased.

Probate No. 923700043 ES

The Court having reviewed the file herein finds that a
Petition

to

Probate

was

filed

and

Order

granting

same

was

subsequently entered. Subsequent thereto, a Petition to Vacate was
filed by Petitioner Naillon.

The Court deems this to be a Motion

to Vacate under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
hereafter "Motion to Vacate", Memorandum in support was attached
thereto. Subsequently, a Motion to Dismiss the Petition of Naillon
was filed by the attorney for the Personal Representative together
with a Memorandum in Support thereof.

The Court concludes that

this should have been an Objection to the Motion to Vacate and
attached Memorandum in Support thereof, hereafter "Objection".

At

the same time a Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Naillon was
filed, pursuant to Rule 56(e),
Support

thereof.

A

document

together with a Memorandum in
entitled

Assent

to

Personal

Representative's Motion was also filed.,- The Court deems same to be
a joinder by Carol Schrcader in the Objection filed on behalf of
the Personal Representative and for the reasons set forth therein.

000145

2

Subsequently, Naillon filed a response to the Motion to Strike
Affidavit

on March 26, 1993

and

also

filed a reply

to

the

"Objection11 and Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss the
Petition.

Subsequent

thereto,

on

behalf

of

the

Personal

Representative, a "Reply Memorandum" in Support of the Motion to
Dismiss was filed and an Objection to that Reply Memorandum was
filed on behalf of Naillon.

Finally, a response to Objection to

the

filed

Reply

Memorandum

Representative.

The

was
last

three

on

behalf

filed

of

the

documents

Personal
appear

to

misperceive the procedural posture of the case, at least as far as
the Court has concluded and outlined above.
The Court concludes that the matters at issue herein, as of
the present time, are first, should the Affidavit of Naillon be
stricken and secondly, whether the Motion to Vacate under Rule
60(b) should be granted.
Affidavit

although

conclusions

and

The Court herein concludes that the

somewhat

not

inartfully

setting

forth

drafted,

facts

upon

e.g.

drawing

which

those

conclusions were drawn and not setting forth factual information
from individuals who may have known the deceased and could have
testified (by Affidavit) of her mental condition at the time the
Will was executed, does never the less, provide some factual
information

and

the

conclusionary matters.

Court

is able

to

ferret out

the

other

Having said that however, the Court finds

the Affidavit to be insufficient to give rise to a justifiable

f\ r\ r\ -4 t r%

3

reason for setting aside the original Order of Judge Bunnell. This
is so, even though as is necessary under these circumstances, the
Court must view the Affidavit and Motion of the moving party,
Naillon, in the light most favorable to Movant.
The Court does conclude that the Motion was filed within the
time limitations set forth herein and does not believe that the
Motion was a substitute Motion for an appeal which may otherwise
have cut off the remedies available to Petitioner.

The standing

issue raised in the pleadings of the Personal Representative is
misperceived.

The Court concludes that an individual to have

standing in this situation, need only be-an interested party.

It

is true that a number of individuals would have priority to
appointment, but it is further true that the Petitioner Naillon
herein has standing as being an interested party and in the event
of relinquishment by the other parties might actually be entitled
to appointment as the Personal Representative, although based upon
the pleadings herein, it seems unlikely that such a relinquishment
would take place.

Finally, in the event that Petitioner Naillon

had filed a Petition for Declaration for Intestacy along with his
Motion to Vacate, and had set forth therein sufficient allegations
for the Court to conclude that a hearing thereon must necessarily
be held, there would have been an opportunity for Petitioner
Naillon to produce evidence showing undue influence.
The only factual allegation contained in the Affidavit that

cr>n,i /*7

4

bears upon some undo influence at the time of the execution of the
Will is really inferential, and that is from the fact that Mr.
Gitlin was named in the Will as a donee' five years ago and was
named as a grantee in a deed executed seven days prior to the
decedents death, at a time when Affiant believed she may have been
in pain and under the influence of some unspecified drugs. We are
asked to infer that Gitlin exercised undue influence over the
Decedent's execution

of the Will.

That inference requires a leap

of faith that this Co^pt cannot make.
DATED this y j i a y of September, 1993.

K. HALLIDAY
District Judge

r% n n -f /! O

5

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the Q ^

day of September, 1993, a

true and correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM DECISION was
mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:
James D. Gilson
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
Attorneys at Law
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P.O. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Jeffrey R. Hill
HILL, •• HARRISON, HILL & FISHER
Attorneys at Law
3 319 North University Avenue, #2 00
Provo, Utah 84604
Ralph W, Rasmussen
BRADFORD & BRADY
Attorneys at Law
389 North University Avenue
Provo, Utah 84601

Secretary
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CCT 12 S3
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY"C " ^TAJF f":!"'"/jt'l^°^^T
James D. Gilson (5472)
Susan G. Lawrence (5305)
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P. O. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 532-3333
Attorneys for Robert Gitlin,
Personal Representative of the Estate
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF CARBON COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH, PROBATE DIVISION
In the Matter Of the Estate

)

of

ORDER

MILDRED C. MEEKS,
Probate No. 923700043
Deceased.

)

Pending before the Court is the Petition to Vacate or
Set Aside Order that was filed by petitioner George F. Naillon,
through his attorney Jeffrey R. Hill, which was opposed by
Robert Gitlin, the Personal Representative of decendant' s
estate, through his attorney James D. Gilson.

Carol Schroader,

through her attorney Ralph W. Rasmussen, Jr., joined in the
opposition filed by the Personal Representative.

Also pending

is the Motion to Strike Affidavit of George F. Naillon, which
was filed by the Personal Representative.
The Court, having reviewed the file herein, and
having reviewed the briefs filed in connection with the above
referenced Petition and Motion to Strike, and based upon the
reasons set forth in the Court' s Memorandum Decision dated
September 3, 1993 in connection therewith,
nnn

1 rz r\

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Strike the
Affidavit of George F. Naillon is denied;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Petition to Vacate or
Set Aside Order filed by petitioner^-£Jaillon is denied.
DATED this // - day of Septsmbex, 1993.

Bf Mill
for George F. Naillon

-2-
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HILL, HARRISON & HILL
Jeffrey R. Hill (#4596)
F. McKay Johnson (#3725)
3319 North University Avenue, #200
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: (801) 375-6600
Attorneys for Petitioner

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH, PROBATE DIVISION
In the Matter of the Estate

NOTICE OF APPEAL

of
MILDRED C. MEEKS,
i

Deceased.

Probate No. 923700043

Petitioner, George F. Naillon in the above-entitled
matter, by and through his attorney of record Jeffrey R. Hillf
hereby appeals the Order dated October 12, 1993, denying
Petitioner's

Petition

to

Vacate

or

Set

Aside

Order.

Petitioner appeals from the Order entered by Judge Bruce K.
Halliday of the above-entitled District Court to the Utah
Court of Appeals.
DATED this 8th day of November, 1993.

, J e f ^ r ^ R . Hill /
**
Attorae^i^r Petitioner

r

ii i

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I personally mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Notice of Appeal on this
day of November, 1993, by first-class U.S. mail, postage
prepaid, to the following:
James D. Gilson
Attorney for Personal Representative
50 S. Main, Suite 1600
Salt Lake City, UT 84144
Ralph W. Rasmussen
389 N. University Ave.
Provo, UT 84601

e c r e t a r y ~ ^
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH
332 STATE CAPITOL
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114
January 25, 1994
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
James D. Gilson
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
Attorneys at Law
50 S. Main, #1600
P.O. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, UT 84144

In The Matter of The Estate
of Mildred C. Meeks.
George F. Naillon,
Appellant.

No. 930565
923700043

Appellee's motion to summarily dismiss appeal is this day
denied, and the court defers its ruling until plenary
presentation and consideration of the case. Utah R. App. P.
10(f).
Upon denial of motion for summary disposition and
pursuant to Rule 13 of the Utah R. App. P. the record index
on appeal has been filed. The appellant's brief is due
March 7, 1994. The record in this case may be withdrawn from
the district court only upon written request of the attorney
of record.
Geoffrey J. Butler
Clerk

